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Building the Education and Training Pillar of 
the University of Tennessee’s Institute for 
Nuclear Security 
 
Howard L. Hall 






The University of Tennessee (UT) developed its first formal and coordinated efforts in nuclear security 
education in 2008-2009 with its graduate certificate program in nuclear security in the Department of 
Nuclear Engineering. Building on this work, in 2011 UT established the UT Institute for Nuclear Security 
(INS) as a collaborative center at the university to expand its curricular impact as well as foster research 
and partnerships with nearby major governmental facilities engaged in nuclear security work. Oak Ridge 
National Laboratory (ORNL), the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12), and Oak Ridge Associated 
Universities (ORAU) have joined with UT as charter members of INS. The institute has successfully 
fostered the development of a near-comprehensive nuclear security curriculum within multiple academic 
units. In addition to traditional academic offering, INS is developing a comprehensive strategy for a 
professional development short-course series that facilitates postgraduate entry into the nuclear security 
field and continuing education. 
I. Introduction 
In both the United States and internationally, the ability to sustain efforts in nuclear security is eroding as 
the population of skilled scientists and engineers in this field declines. For example, Wogman et al. noted 
as early as 2004 that 75% of the nuclear personnel in the US Department of Energy national laboratories 
would be eligible to retire by 2010 [1]. This decline is exacerbated by the contraction of programs and 
facilities wherein hands-on experience with security-significant quantities of nuclear material and its 
related processing can occur and the concomitant spiraling expense of academic experimental facilities 
that handle radioactive materials. Similar “megatrends” are affecting the international nuclear security 
community [2] and key international organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA). As an example, a recent study of nuclear and radiochemists found similar losses in both the 
population of this skill set as well as the capacity to produce them [3].  
 
At the same time, challenges to international nuclear security regimes (such as the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty) are mounting from various nation-states – Pakistan [4] and North Korea [5–7] have openly tested 
nuclear weapons in the last decade, and other suspected proliferant states (such as Iran and Syria) [4, 8] 
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are or have recently been the subjects of grave concern over their nuclear intentions. The recent 
conclusion of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action [9] between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the 
“P5+1” countries (the United States, United Kingdom, France, China, Russia, and Germany) regarding 
Iran’s nuclear program has created significant new demand for IAEA safeguards inspectors, and 
especially IAEA safeguards inspectors from countries other than the P5+1 states [10]. Terrorist groups 
such as al-Qaeda are on record [11] as seeking nuclear capabilities, and Daesh has raised troubling 
concerns about a possible nuclear nexus for its targets [12, 13]. 
 
It is recognized that these challenges due to a graying workforce and inadequate pipeline of new talent are 
troubling at best, and a threat to global security at the extreme. Replacement personnel, when available, 
are typically educated in an academic environment that does not address the unique and critical problems 
that make nuclear security or safeguards challenging. Furthermore, access to experimental or operational 
nuclear facilities and reactors is increasingly limited [3], reducing the experiential knowledgebase of new 
graduates to “academic exercises” or models and simulation.  
 
Furthermore, the increased interest in nuclear power as a carbon-free energy source will lead to new 
national and international enrichment facilities and fuel cycle processing facilities – increasing the 
demand (and competition) for nuclear scientists and engineers. Other non-nuclear industries also compete 
for nuclear engineering graduates. Despite the 2011 nuclear accident at Fukushima [14–16], there does 
not appear to be an appreciable slowing of the expansion of nuclear power programs overall in the global 
energy market. 
 
Some government initiatives are being undertaken to address these issues – for example, the US National 
Nuclear Security Administration’s Next Generation Safeguards Initiative has a human capital 
development component for safeguards specialists. Additionally, recently-issued studies highlight the 
need for investment in nuclear forensics science, including personnel education and development [17, 18]. 
 
To address the broader problem of sustainable education of the next generation of experts in nuclear 
sciences, an integrated program, with roots in academia, is needed. This paper describes the strategies that 
the University of Tennessee has taken to develop a robust educational program to meet the challenge of 
educating the future generations of global experts in nuclear security, including a deliberate expansion of 
its nuclear engineering program to include the development of a specific line of instruction and research 
in nuclear security in 2009 [19], and a broadening of that effort to the whole of the university under the 
auspices of the UT Institute for Nuclear Security in 2012.  
 
This paper begins by taking a step back and defining – broadly – what UT means by the term nuclear 
security, describes the origins and rationale for establishing a campus-wide Institute to help promote 
education and graduate research training in this inherently interdisciplinary field, provides a detailed 
summary of the curriculum developed and deployed, and concludes with a brief summary of UT efforts to 
share and support international academic engagement in nuclear security education. To some extent, the 
UT experience can serve to inform other programs on development and sustainability of such efforts. 
II. Defining Nuclear Security 
Within the UT program, we take a very broad view of the span of activities that fall under the term 
nuclear security. In our usage, we mean it as a field of education and research that encompasses all the 
activities that support the following objectives: 
 
 Beneficial applications of nuclear or radiological materials and devices are not diverted to illicit 
or malicious purposes. Potential threat materials are secured or replaced where feasible so as to 
reduce opportunities for malicious use. 
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 Nuclear weapons and related technology are appropriately controlled and monitored. Nuclear 
arms control and reduction priorities are supported and enabled. 
 The proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear/radiological threats is discouraged, 
detected, and/or dissuaded. Systems that support the peaceful uses of nuclear energy are 
increasingly proliferation resistant. 
 Efforts to acquire or use nuclear/radiological threats by malefactors are anticipated, stopped, 
investigated, and effectively countered.  
 Consequences of radiological or nuclear incidents, including attacks, are mitigated or minimized 
through prior planning and engineering, as well as effective response, emergency management, 
and remediation. 
 
Explicitly, our use of the term nuclear security is best understood in the context of the “3S” strategy 
(Safety, Security, and Safeguards) that has gained recent prominence in the community. Technical aspects 
of nuclear safety within our curriculum are already well-established in the UT Department of Nuclear 
Engineering, and serve as a base on which our security and safeguards interests can draw as needed. 
 
Many applications in nuclear security are found at the intersection of traditional academic disciplines, and 
do not rest easily within the normal stovepipes of existing academic departments. For example, the 
negotiations of new treaties require the implementation of verification and inspection regimes. These 
negotiations require advice about technology to inform the agreed frameworks, and the agreements also 
define research and development activities to improve the effectiveness of inspection and verification 
activities. Likewise, the evolution of new technology for supporting law enforcement efforts creates new 
frontiers in policy and law [20], including, notably, laws that include strategic trade controls that can be 
both highly technical as well as legally complex. 
III. The Structure of the UT Institute for Nuclear Security 
The Institute for Nuclear Security is organizationally located within the UT Howard H. Baker Jr. Center 
for Public Policy (“Baker Center”), and reaches across the many UT disciplines and academic 
departments that can contribute to the nuclear security field. The Baker Center is a campus-wide entity 
answerable directly to the chancellor of the university. The placement of INS in the Baker Center was 
deliberate, to allow the institute to function outside the traditional academic units of the university so as to 
encourage cross-departmental collaboration and cooperation. Over the four years since INS was 
established, we have expanded UT’s contributions to nuclear security from the original nucleus of 
activities in the Department of Nuclear Engineering to a much broader, multidisciplinary base in which 
many academic units both contribute to the global challenges but also develop distinctive and successful 
programs within each unit. 
 
As UT is a research-intensive university with aspirations of even greater research productivity and 
impact, the development of a robust and impactful research portfolio is an important success metric for 
INS. The university is also the state of Tennessee’s land grant university [21], and hence has a 
institutional commitment to teaching, research, and service across the university. Supporting this 
university mission, INS fosters research, development, service, teaching, and related scholarly activities 
across the university as well as with our external partners.  
 
In particular, INS focuses on those activities that capitalize on partnership and collaboration as well as 
interdisciplinary needs and challenges that the university can address. The institute also supports the 
development of enhanced educational capabilities for nuclear security within the academic units of the 
UT, and more broadly through a variety of means. A large number of professional staff from INS’s 
partners are also engaged with the institute, including some that are now fully embedded with INS on the 
UT campus. 
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The institute focuses its efforts in five principal areas, which are referred to as the “pillars” of INS: 1) 
policy, law, and diplomacy; 2) education and training; 3) science and technology; 4) operational and 
intelligence capability building; and 5) “real-world” missions and applications. Our concept of a systems 
approach to nuclear security is designed specifically to encourage crosscutting efforts and collaborations 
between academia, government, the private sector, and the public. The institute is fostering a long-term 
comprehensive approach in its work that is informed by the “whole of government” [22] and “whole of 
society” [23] concepts advanced for addressing nuclear security concerns. 
 
 
Figure 1: The thematic "pillars" of INS 
While INS has made significant progress in developing its programs and capabilities in all of these pillars, 
this paper will confine itself to the Education and Training Pillar. Work in the educational/training front 
has been quite active, resulting in the development of a considerably extended curriculum, both in terms 
of coursework and in number of academic departments involved. 
 
Other participants in INS include the charter partners – Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), the Y-
12 National Security Complex (Y-12), and Oak Ridge Associated Universities (ORAU) – and each of 
these partners have contributed expertise, facilities, and research partnership opportunities that have 
strongly contributed to the success of the UT program. For example, ORNL makes available their 
Safeguards Laboratory [24] for student measurements with plutonium and highly enriched uranium and 
Y-12 staff in their Alarm Response Training program [25] collaborate with students in developing and 
testing physical security exercises for hypothetical nuclear facilities. 
 
Equally importantly, the engagement of these partners along with others in industry, military, civilian, and 
international organizations helps UT keep the educational focus of its program relevant and informed 
about current challenges and needs. 
IV. UT’s Nuclear Security Curriculum 
A. Building on the History of the UT program in Nuclear 
Engineering 
Sean F. Johnston’s review of the development of the field of nuclear engineering (comparing the 
development of the field in the United States and the United Kingdom) describes the academic program 
as an early postwar outgrowth of the Manhattan Project, and notes that nuclear engineering largely grew 
out of programs at what are now Oak Ridge National Laboratory and Argonne National Laboratory [26]. 
The objective of these programs was to transfer knowledge gained in developing the nuclear fuel cycle 
and nuclear reactors for weapons production to applications in nuclear power generation (initially for 
military purposes, and subsequently for civilian applications). Oak Ridge worked with the nearby 
University of Tennessee and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology to establish the series of 
educational initiatives, including the somewhat whimsically nicknamed “Clinch College of Nuclear 
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Knowledge,” as the Clinton Training School (established in 1946) was known. Famous alumni of this 
program include Admiral Hyman Rickover, who lead the development of the US nuclear navy, and 
Admiral James Watkins, US Secretary of Energy from 1989 through 1993. 
 
Subsequent efforts in Oak Ridge included the Oak Ridge Institute of Nuclear Studies, which focused on 
biological applications of nuclear science, and the Oak Ridge School of Reactor Technology, which 
addressed classified military applications of nuclear power. 
As Johnston notes, essentially all the current US academic programs grew out of the Eisenhower 
Administration’s Atoms for Peace initiative, which opened up much of the nuclear information and 
technology to the civilian sector. The Department of Nuclear Engineering at the University of Tennessee 
(UTNE) was founded in 1957, and is the oldest Department of Nuclear Engineering in the United States 
[27]. 
 
Like many nuclear programs in the United States, UTNE saw flat or declining enrollments during the 
1980’s and 1990’s, which mirrored broader trends in the industry. However, the last decade has seen 
substantial growth in the department’s undergraduate enrollments and a less dramatic but still significant 
expansion in graduate enrollments. 
 
 
Figure 2: Aggregate enrollment in UT Nuclear Engineering program from 1998 to 2015. Numbers 
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B. Department of Nuclear Engineering (UTNE) 
In 2009, UTNE established a graduate certificate program in nuclear security science and analysis 
(NSSA) [19]. The program is designed primarily for technical students seeking specialization in nuclear 
security science and engineering. Additionally, this program prepares graduate students to engage in the 
research and development of new tools and processes related to nuclear security science and analysis. 
 
The certificate requires the completion of twelve semester credit hours (SCH), and is offered in the 
master’s of science track in the UTNE curriculum. As currently constituted, twelve credit hours in the 
NSSA program would constitute half of the total graduate coursework credit hours required for a student 
to complete their master’s degree, and those credit hours can be earned in a suite of courses shown in 
Table 1 in the Appendix. 
 
The selection of courses, which must be approved by the department, is determined through a student 
advising conference that considers the student’s personal interests, academic background, and work 
experience. Criteria for acceptance into the NSSA certificate program are the same as for acceptance into 
the M.S. program in nuclear engineering. Descriptions of each course are provided in Table 1, which 
shows the courses that support the NSSA certificate as well as the number of student that have taken each 
(as of the 2015-2016 academic year [AY]). 
C. Department of Political Science 
Partnering with the Department of Nuclear Engineering and the Howard H. Baker Jr. Center for Public 
Policy, the Department of Political Science (PoliSci) has transformed their master’s in public 
administration program into a master’s in public policy and administration (MPPA) degree, with the 
option to tailor the curriculum into a global security studies track. 
 
The MPPA degree is a 30-SCH program, and to fulfill the requirements of the global security track 
students are required to fulfill 9 SCH out of the total 30 SCH from the coursework in Table 2. The MPPA 
program became available for enrollment in the fall semester of 2013. 
 
Prior to the development of the MPPA program, however, the Department of Political Science, the Baker 
Center, and INS collaborated to develop a special seminar (Arms Control and Treaty Negotiation) as a 
centerpiece course in the PoliSci global security–related curriculum. This course, co-taught by Professor 
Brandon Prins and previously Ambassador Thomas Graham, focuses on the strategies, contexts, and 
tactics associated with development of complex international treaties. The class concludes with an 
extended mock international negotiation, with class participants representing various nation-states in the 
simulation. 
D. Department of Chemistry 
In AY 2015, the departments of Chemistry and Nuclear Engineering collaborated to implement a joint 
graduate certificate program in radiochemistry. The 12-SCH certificate is earned by completing four 
courses as shown in Table 3. Criteria for acceptance into the program are the same as for acceptance into 
the graduate programs in chemistry or nuclear engineering. This new Radiochemistry Graduate 
Certificate is especially valuable in light of the recent study indicating the strong need for these programs 
[3]. 
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V. Addressing the Mid-Career Entrant 
Another pathway for personnel to enter into a career in nuclear security applications is via a postgraduate 
career transition. These entrants typically have been in the workforce for some time, and will have some 
level of background education, but usually no nuclear security–specific education or training. 
Furthermore, these individuals – and their employers – generally cannot accommodate the typical 18-24 
month cycles for graduate degrees. To support these mid-career entrants, INS has developed a 
professional development and training effort that provides training and familiarization for new entrants, 
but does so in smaller increments than a typical semester-long class. These classes typically last a 
maximum of five days for ease of participation. These training classes ultimately lead to professional 
certificates for the participants, along with relevant continuing education credits for those with 
professional licensure requirements (such as professional engineers, attorneys, etc.). 
 
These are not just conference room lectures. Each course contains extensive in-class interactive exercises 
as well as extensive experiential learning opportunities through our partners. Our emphasis in developing 
these courses is to make maximum use of the opportunity to see and experience real working facilities 
that are relevant to the topic of the course. In addition, we make extensive use of working subject matter 
experts drawn from all the partners of INS. 
 
At the conclusion of this the sequence of training courses of the program, successful participants receive a 
certificate from INS along with the necessary documentation to claim their continuing education credits. 
 
Over the last few years, INS has developed and provided a number of courses and workshops on nuclear 
security. In many cases, these workshops have been supported by the US National Nuclear Security 
Administration or the US Department of State. These workshops have focused on developing an 
awareness of nuclear security isues and practices, insider threat issues, physical security issues, and 
various strategies for teaching and training others (“train-the-trainer” approaches). In many cases these 
workshops are presented with our partners from ORNL, the Y-12 Nuclear Security Complex, the UT Law 
Enforcement Innovation Center, and other universities as appropriate. 
VI. Supporting the Academic Nuclear Security Global 
Community of Interest 
The scale of the worldwide need for expertise in nuclear security is, of course, well beyond the capability 
of UT to address alone. Therefore, INS also engages and supports the dissemination of nuclear security 
curricula worldwide. Part of this dissemination effort includes sharing curricula and part includes 
supporting new faculty interested in teaching nuclear security in their home institution. 
 
One of the major vehicles that supports this international engagement is the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) and its support for the International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN), a 
voluntary network of universities and related entities from around the world. This network shares 
curricular materials and best practices, enables inter-university collaborations, and encourages faculty 
development among the emerging global network of nuclear security educational programs. The 
University of Tennessee has participated in INSEN since its inception, and has supplied curricular 
materials in nuclear forensics and human reliability as well as supporting the development of INSEN and 
IAEA guides and working group functions. Through INSEN working groups, the need for faculty to be 
able to publish research in nuclear security was identified, as was the lack of an appropriate peer-
reviewed vehicle for such work. That realization led to the INS decision to sponsor the development of 
this journal, the International Journal of Nuclear Security [28]. 
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Additionally, UT has supported several extended faculty visits from international universities interested in 
expanding their nuclear security curricula, ranging from short visits/study tours to hosting extended 
faculty visits of several months. Over the last few years, UT has hosted faculty visits from Indonesia, 
Jordan, Brazil, South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria, Morocco, Ghana, and Brazil. These visits are frequently 
supported by the US Department of State, the US National Nuclear Security Administration, and the 
IAEA. 
 
The Institute of Nuclear Security has worked bilaterally with a number of international educational 
programs through US National Nuclear Security Administration and US State Department efforts as well 
as direct connections with international stakeholders, such as IAEA’s International Nuclear Security 
Educational Network (INSEN). This has included dispatching UT faculty and staff to support in-country 
development of curricula, program reviews, and other academic support activities. 
VII. Conclusions 
The University of Tennessee has established and continues to refine a robust interdisciplinary nuclear 
security curriculum, building off an initial base in the Nuclear Engineering Department but expanding 
organically into other academic units as well. The university is partnering with key laboratories and 
facilities in the region to ensure that UT students have an educational experience that is highly relevant to 
the needs of the nuclear security community, as well as gaining access to unique facilities and materials. 
 
The university has also developed the early beginnings of a curricula of short courses and workshops to 
support the competency development of mid-career entrants into the field of nuclear security. This work 
continues to mature. 
 
Another major focus for INS in its early implementation has been developing connectivity between the 
UT academic program and the international nuclear security community. In this period, INS has worked 
bilaterally and multilaterally with a number of international educational programs through direct 
connections and through international collaborations such as INSEN.  
 
The establishment of INS within UT has been an important step forward, formalizing partnerships and 
serving as a vehicle for promoting nuclear security across the university’s missions in teaching, research, 
and public service. Under the auspices of INS, UT has continued to expand its academic curriculum and 
student engagement as well as undertake an important effort in addressing the needs of mid-career 
entrants into the field. 
VIII. Appendix: Coursework Tables 
 
Table 1. Coursework qualifying for the UTNE NSSA certificate 
Course 
Number 
Course Title and Description # of Students since 
(Inception/Upgrade) as 
of AY 2016 
NE 530 Nuclear Security Science and Analysis – Understanding nuclear threats 
and the evolution of nuclear threats to present day.  (This course is 
required) 
120 (2009) 
NE 531 Global Nuclear Security Culture – Principles and best practices in nuclear 
security, nuclear safety, and nuclear materials safeguards (“3S”) culture 
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NE 532 Advanced Topics in Nuclear Security Science and Analysis – Advanced 
topics in radiation measurement science, nondestructive assay techniques, 
and nuclear materials safeguards.  
24 (2010) 
NE 533 Physical Security for High-Consequence Facilities – Design criteria and 
performance basis that make up a physical security program for high-
consequence and critical environments.  
54 (2014) 
NE 534 Physical Security Vulnerability Assessment – Evaluation of threat basis, 
facility characterization, and asset determination.  
31 (2014) 
NE 535 Nuclear Chemistry and Radiochemistry – Introduction to nuclear and 
radiochemistry. Cross-listed with UT Department of Chemistry 
7 (2014) 
NE 536 Export Control and Nonproliferation – Principles and regulatory 
frameworks for controlling sensitive nuclear technology 
15 (2014) 
NE 537 Human Reliability in Nuclear Systems – Methodology for assessing and 
managing human reliability factors in nuclear systems.  
25 (2014) 
NE 542 Management of Radioactive Materials – Technology for processing, 
treatment, handling and storage of radioactive nuclides. Analytical and 
numerical methods for evaluating environmental impact of radioactive 
materials. Licensing and regulation issues. 
98 (2011) 
NE 550 Radiation Measurements Laboratory – Physics and electronics associated 
with radiation detection and measurement, methods of data analysis. 
Applicability of particular detector measurements and fundamentals of 
radiation detection instrumentation operation. 
61 (2011) 
NE 551 Radiation Protection – Fundamental concepts and definitions used in 
radiation protection. Interactions of photons, neutrons and heavy charged 
particles with matter and mechanisms of energy loss. Chemical and 
biological effects of radiation. Introduction to current radiation protection 
standards and regulations.  
179 (2010) 
NE 571 Reactor Theory and Design – Analytical and numerical techniques for 
neutronics modeling of nuclear systems. Forward and adjoint Boltzmann 
transport equation. Multigroup diffusion theory. Core analysis methods 
and codes. 
125 (2011) 
NE 404 Nuclear Fuel Cycle – Mining, milling, enrichment, fuel fabrication, in-core 
management, nuclear reactor theory, reprocessing, waste disposal, 
regulatory requirements, nuclear facilities, nuclear material accountancy 
and physical protection. (This is a senior-level undergraduate course, and 
must be taken for graduate credit to qualify) 
108 (2011) 
NE 433 Principles of Health Physics – Radiation quantities, limits and risk 
assessment, external and internal dosimetry, biological effects of 
radiation, radiation detection, radiation interactions and decay, 
applications. (This is a senior-level undergraduate course, and must be 
taken for graduate credit to qualify) 
297 (2011) 
NE 470 Nuclear Reactor Theory I – Fundamentals of reactor physics relative to 
cross sections. (This is a senior-level undergraduate course, and must be 
taken for graduate credit to qualify) 
356 (2010) 
PS 686 Arms Control, Deterrence and Nuclear Nonproliferation - Challenges to 
US and global security created by the existence of nuclear weapons and 
power. 
22 (2013) 
NE 635 Nuclear Forensics – Introduction to nuclear forensics. Principles of 29 (2013) 
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isotopic signatures and their origins, ultra-trace radiochemical 






Table 2. Courses available to fulfill the global security track in the UT MPPA degree program 
Course 
Number 
Course Title and Description # of Students since 
(Inception/Upgrade) as 
of AY 2016 
PS 556 Policy Analysis – Strategies and techniques for identification and 
analysis of public problems and policy solutions. 
29 (2015) 
PS 571 Foundations of Security Studies – Theoretical and legal underpinnings 
to security policy.  
13 (2015) 
PS 573 War, Peace, and Grand Strategy – Issues in war, asymmetric conflict, 
and national/global strategies to address conflicts.  
0 (Pending first 
offering) 
PS 580 International Relations – Survey of literature and major aspects of 
international politics. 
33 (2015) 
PS 682 Theory and Analysis of US Foreign Policy – Theoretical approaches to 
decision making in foreign policy area and analysis of policy-making 
process. 
0 (Pending first 
offering) 
PS 684 International Law – Provides the analytical tools necessary to evaluate 
the legality of events under international law. Presents the law relevant 
to politics, such as the use of force, human rights, war crimes, 
international courts, principles of jurisdiction, and air, space and sea 
law. 
0 (Pending first 
offering) 
PS 685 Conflict Processes – Theoretical explanations for the causes and 
processes of war and international disputes or crises. 
15 (2015) 
PS 686 Arms Control, Deterrence and Nuclear Nonproliferation - Challenges 
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Course Title and Description # of Students since 
(Inception/Upgrade) as 
of AY 2016 
CHEM 580 Radio- and Nuclear Chemistry – Nuclear properties, structure, and 
models; radioactivity, decay processes; radioemission interaction with 
matter; radioemission detection; radioactive tracers; industrial; 
research and medical applications; fission; fusion; carcinogenesis; 
environmental radioactivity; radiation protection 
10 (2015) 
NE 550 Radiation Measurements Laboratory – Physics and electronics 
associated with radiation detection and measurement, methods of data 
analysis. Applicability of particular detector measurements and 
fundamentals of radiation detection instrumentation operation. 
61 (2011) 
CHEM 511 Analytical Separations – Physical principles and instrumentation of the 
modern methods of separation of mixtures into simpler fractions or 
pure compounds.  
33 (2015) 
CHEM 531 Materials Inorganic Chemistry and Catalysis – A survey of the 
structure properties of contemporary inorganic materials. Topics 
include structure and bonding, methods of synthesis and 
characterization, introduction to heterogeneous catalysis. 
20 (2015) 
NE 433 Principles of Health Physics – Radiation quantities, limits and risk 
assessment, external and internal dosimetry, biological effects of 
radiation, radiation detection, radiation interactions and decay, 
applications. (This is a senior-level undergraduate course, and must be 
taken for graduate credit to qualify) 
297 (2011) 
NE 635 Nuclear Forensics – Introduction to nuclear forensics. Principles of 
isotopic signatures and their origins, ultra-trace radiochemical 
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